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1	 Documents	available	
at	http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/docu-
ments_en.htm
European Neighbourhood Policy Package 
– Conclusions for the Eastern Partners
Rafał Sadowski
In 2011 the European Union began a process aimed at reforming its policy 
on the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The change in circumstances 
in neighbouring countries following the Arab Spring, along with the lack of 
significant progress regarding Eastern Europe’s integration with the EU, 
formed the main driving force behind this process. The prime objective of 
the changes to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the need to 
introduce new incentives for partner countries to modernise and integrate 
more closely with the EU Another aim was to increase the flexibility of 
EU instruments (by adapting them to the specific context of each partner 
state). One year later, on 15 May 2012, the European Commission and the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published 
the European Neighbourhood Policy Package which reported on the pro-
gress made in the implementation of the ENP over the preceding year and 
set out the aims and Action Plans for 20131.
An analysis of the outcomes of changes made to the EU policy towards 
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus suggests that the aim of the re-
vision was aimed more at addressing the changing political landscape in 
the region rather than at the implementation of a substantial reform of 
the neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based on bureaucratic pro-
cedures (the negotiation of bilateral agreements, the implementation of 
support programmes). These have only a limited capacity to bring about 
lasting change in the region, as has been exemplified by the deterioration 
of democratic standards in a number of countries; this was highlighted in 
EU’s own reports. This problem is particularly clear in the case of Ukraine; 
until recently it was seen as the leader of European integration but is now 
raising much concern due to a deterioration in the state of democracy there.
EU instruments have a limited influence on the situation in Eastern Part-
nership countries and the region’s significance on the EU’s agenda is fall-
ing (the priority is now given to counteracting the economic crisis, and 
prominence in the neighbourhood policy has been given to the Southern 
Mediterranean). In response to this EU policy on Eastern Europe will focus 
to a larger extent on technical and sectoral cooperation.
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Changes to EU Neighbourhood Policy 
The	Arab	Spring	in	2011	significantly	altered	the	political	landscape	in	the	EU’s	Southern	
Neighbourhood.	Regime	change	in	Tunisia,	Egypt	and	Libya,	as	well	as	democratic	reform	
in	Morocco,	and	also	Algeria’s	new	interest	in	establishing	links	with	the	EU	have	together	
created	 a	 new	 context	 for	 EU	policy	 towards	 the	South.	 In	 the	Eastern	Neighbourhood,	
meanwhile,	the	launch	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	introduced	a	new	framework	for	the	Eu-
ropean	integration	of	the	region,	but	was	accompanied	by	growing	concerns	over	the	state	
of	democracy	in	some	of	the	partner	countries.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU	has	been	demon-
strating	a	growing	ambition	to	play	a	more	significant	political	role	in	the	international	arena.	
A	number	of	institutional	changes	were	introduced	in	the	Lisbon	Treaty	to	support	the	EU	
in	the	pursuit	of	this	aim,	including:	the	appointment	of	an	EU	High	Representative	for	For-
eign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy	and	the	creation	of	a	new	European	External	Action	Service.
The	 above	mentioned	 events	 altered	 the	 context	 of	 the	 European	Neighbourhood	Policy	
(ENP)	and	gave	impetus	to	a	review	of	its	overall	principles	and	a	modernisation	of	its	in-
struments.	In	2011,	the	EU	rolled	out	a	series	of	changes	aimed	at	increasing	the	effective-
ness	of	 its	instruments.	The	new	approach	is	set	out	in	strategic	documents	which	were	
published	in	2011	and	their	implementation	is	reviewed	in	the	2012	ENP	Package.	Its	key	
elements	are	presented	below:		
1.	The	development	of	tailor-made	relations	with	each	of	the	partner	countries,	based	on	
local	 conditions	and	specification.	This	aims	 to	ensure	a	greater	 flexibility	 for	EU	 instru-
ments	–	addressing	the	specific	aspirations	of	each	state	–	and	to	implement	joint	agendas	
at	a	bilateral	level	(including,	ENP	Action	Plans	and	the	negotiation	of	specific	agreements).	
The	ENP	covers	a	range	of	countries	from	
different	regions	(across	North	Africa	and	
Eastern	 Europe),	 which	 set	 themselves	
different	 goals	 in	 their	 cooperation	 with	
the	 EU	 (Moldova,	 for	 instance,	 is	 inter-
ested	 in	 closer	 integration,	while	Belarus	
wants	 to	 focus	 on	 developing	 trade	 links	
without	political	integration	with	the	EU).
2.	 The	 ‘more	 for	 more’	 principle	 rewards	 partner	 countries	 with	 greater	 support	 from	
the	EU	 (including	 financial	 support	 and	 enhanced	 access	 to	EU	programmes	 and	 agen-
das)	in	exchange	for	progress	in	European	integration	and	the	implementation	of	reforms.	
The	objective	here	is	to	introduce	a	more	effective	system	of	 incentives	(more	attractive,	
clearly	defined	benefits	for	partner	countries),	but	also	to	have	an	effective	system	of	sanc-
tions	at	its	disposal.		
3.	Closer	cooperation	with	civil	society.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	the	EU	has	established	new	
instruments:	the	Civil	Society	Facility	(CSF)	and	the	European	Endowment	for	Democracy	
(EED).	The	decision	to	adopt	a	more	active	role	in	supporting	civil	society	was	brought	about	
by	the	failure	of	EU	policy	towards	the	South;	prior	to	the	revolutions	in	Africa	the	EU	priori-
tised	stability	in	the	region	–	by	cooperating	with	local	regimes	–	rather	than	supporting	the	
development	of	democracy.	In	the	case	of	Eastern	Europe,	it	is	the	civil	organisations	which	
are	the	most	interested	in	establishing	close	links	with	the	EU,	and	which	are	gradually	de-
veloping	the	into	EU’s	key	partners	in	the	region	(for	example,	in	Belarus).
The changes, rolled out in 2011, 
have had a greater impact on 
the EU’s policy towards the South 
than towards the East.
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Changes	in	the	ENP	were	designed	also	to	improve	the	image	of	the	EU	institutions.	These	
had	been	tarnished	by	the	revolutions	 in	 the	Southern	Neighbourhood,	which	called	 into	
question	 the	EU’s	 approach	 to	 the	 region	 as	well	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 success	 in	 the	Eastern	
Neighbourhood.
The	changes,	rolled	out	in	2011,	have	had	a	greater	impact	on	the	EU’s	policy	towards	the	
South	than	towards	the	East.	The	impact	of	the	Arab	Spring	on	the	European	Union,	and	
the	EU’s	interest	in	the	Southern	Mediterranean2	have	led	to	the	EU	having	greater	politi-
cal	engagement	in	the	South	than	in	Eastern	Neighbourhood	countries.	In	its	relations	with	
the	South,	the	EU	has	also	begun	to	transfer	some	of	the	solutions	developed	for	its	East-
ern	Partnership	project,	including	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA).	
In	addition	to	this,	the	EU	has	created	new	instruments,	such	as	a	European	Union	Spe-
cial	Representative	for	the	Southern	Mediterranean	Region,	as	well	as	special	task	forces	
made	up	of	experts	from	EU	institutions,	member	states	and	international	financial	bodies.	
The	 increase	 in	 the	 EU’s	 financial	 support	 was	 greater	 for	 the	 South	 than	 for	 the	 East	
in	2011(see	Appendix,	Table	3).	
Integration between the EU and its Eastern Neighbourhood 
The	ENP	Package,	unveiled	on	15	May	2012	by	 the	European	Commission	and	 the	EU	
High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy,	contains	documents	reviewing	
progress	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 the	preceding	year’s	policy	and	sets	out	 the	aims	and	
an	actions	for	20133.	
The	poor	state	of	democracy	is	seen	in	the	document	as	the	main	challenge	facing	the	coun-
tries	of	the	Eastern	Neighbourhood.	Despite	progress	in	integration	and	the	development	of	
bi-	and	multilateral	cooperation,	the	EU	has	noted	a	deterioration	in	respect	for	democratic	
standards,	human	rights,	and	the	rule	of	law.	
In	 its	country	Progress	Reports,	assessing	progress	 in	European	 integration,	 the	Europe-
an	Commission	 identified	Moldova	as	 the	best	performer	among	 its	eastern	neighbours.	
The	country	has	made	significant	progress	
in	negotiating	bilateral	agreements	(an	As-
sociation	 Agreement,	 a	 Deep	 and	 Com-
prehensive	 Free	 Trade	 agreement,	 and	
a	 visa	 facilitation	 agreement),	 as	well	 as	
in	the	implementation	of	EU	action	plans	
and	recommended	reforms.	The	European	
Commission	also	welcomed	the	steps	tak-
en	by	Chisinau	 to	work	 out	 a	 settlement	
plan	for	the	Transnistrian	conflict.	Among	the	key	challenges	remain:	the	implementation	
of	structural	reforms	(of	the	judiciary,	the	police	and	security	forces,	and	public	administra-
tion),	as	well	as	the	fight	against	corruption	and	the	acceleration	of	privatisation	processes.
Ukraine,	meanwhile,	received	a	critical	assessment,	despite	being	the	most	advanced	in	the	
integration	process	from	all	partner	countries	(Ukraine	is	the	only	state	to	complete	nego-
tiations	on	an	Association	Agreement	and	a	DCFTA).	The	negative	comments	were	largely	
a	result	of	the	imprisonment	of	Yulia	Tymoshenko	and	other	opposition	leaders,	which	the	
West	sees	as	being	politically	motivated.	The	guilty	verdicts	 led	directly	to	the	signing	of	
an	Association	Agreement	being	suspended	despite	the	fact	that	it	had	already	been	ne-
gotiated.	The	document	also	highlighted	high	levels	of	corruption	in	Ukraine	and	a	lack	of	
progress	in:	the	implementation	of	structural	reforms,	the	implementation	of	the	Association	
Agenda,	and	obligations	stemming	from	the	Energy	Community	Treaty.			
2	 Also	due	to	the	region’s	eco-
nomic	significance	–	in	2011	
trade	between	the	EU	and	
the	countries	of	the	Southern	
Neighbourhood	accounted	
for	5.3%	of	the	EU’s	foreign	
trade	–	compared	to	2.2%	
for	the	Eastern	Neighbourhood	
(Source:	Eurostat)
	
	
	
3	 Joint	Communication	of	
the	European	Commission	
and	the	High	Representative:	
A	new	response	to	a	changing	
Neighbourhood,	COM(2011)	
303,	25.05.2011,	
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/
pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf
Despite progress in integration 
and the development of bi- and 
multilateral cooperation, the EU has 
noted a deterioration in respect for 
democratic standards, human rights, 
and the rule of law.
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The	Commission	presented	a	generally	positive	assessment	of	the	implementation	of	action	
plans	by	Georgia,	but	stressed	that	progress	had	been	made	in	the	negotiation	of	bilateral	
agreements,	pointing	 to	 the	 launch	of	negotiations	on	 the	DCFTA,	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
launch	of	visa	dialogue	 is	about	 to	start	 (these	aim	to	define	 the	conditions	 for	visa-free	
travel	 to	 the	 EU).	 The	 assessment	 also	 praised	 progress	made	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 cor-
ruption	and	the	implementation	of	reforms.	The	EU	did	however	also	raise	concerns	over	
the	extent	to	which	local	electoral	processes	may	be	described	as	democratic,	the	domi-
nance	of	the	executive	in	the	political	system,	and	restrictions	on	the	freedom	of	the	press.	
The	Commission	stressed	the	need	to	con-
tinue	reforms	of	the	country’s	judiciary,	and	
recommended	changes	 to	 the	 labour	 law.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	EU	offered	 its	 full	
support	on	Georgia’s	territorial	integrity.
The	progress	made	by	Armenia	(in	nego-
tiations	on	an	Association	Agreement,	and	
the	decision	of	the	Commission	to	launch	
negotiations	on	the	DCFTA)	and	the	eco-
nomic	 reforms	 implemented	 by	 the	 Ar-
menian	 government	 have	 been	 assessed	
rather	 positively.	 The	 EU’s	 objections	 fo-
cused	on	media	freedom	and	the	freedom	
of	 religion,	 and	 also	 on	 high	 levels	 of	 corruption	 and	 a	weak	 judiciary.	 The	 report	 also	
stresses	the	need	to	implement	strategies	which	will	safeguard	human	rights	in	the	country.	
In	addition	to	this,	the	EU	has	called	on	the	Armenian	government	to	shut	down	its	nuclear	
power	plant	in	Metsamor.	
A	 particularly	 important	 challenge	 facing	 both	 Armenia	 and	 Azerbaijan	 is	 the	 Nagorno-	
-Karabakh	conflict.	The	Commission	highlighted	 the	current	deadlock	 in	negotiations	be-
tween	the	two	states,	and	expressed	its	concern	over	the	growing	number	of	incidents	along	
the	shared	border.			
No	 tangible	progress	was	observed in Azerbaijan’s attempts	 to	negotiate	 an	association	
agreement	or	to	 implement	agreed	Action	Plans	and	so	this	country	remains	–	alongside	
Belarus	–	 the	 least	engaged	partner	within	 the	EaP.	Positive	comments	were	made	only	
with	 regard	 to	 the	 growing	 cooperation	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	
the	Southern	Gas	Corridor,	which	has	become	the	main	area	of	cooperation	between	the	
EU	 and	 Azerbaijan.	 EU	 criticism	 of	 Azerbaijan	 is	 primarily	 a	 response	 to	 human	 rights	
abuses	in	the	country,	the	lack	of	democratic	elections,	restrictions	on	the	right	to	assembly,	
the	lack	of	independent	courts,	and	also	the	lack	of	measures	to	counter	corruption,	a	lack	
of	transparency	in	public	finances,	and	an	unfavourable	investment	climate.						
Relations	between	the	EU	and	Belarus	are	the	least	developed,	as	the	country	only	partici-
pates	in	the	ENP	programme	in	a	very	limited	scope.	Consequently,	it	in	fact	cooperates	
mostly	within	the	multilateral	framework	of	the	EaP.	Contrary	to	what	is	the	case	with	the	
five	other	EaP	countries,	the	EU	has	so	far	neither	signed	an	Action	Plan	with	Belarus	nor	
even	planned	 to	start	negotiations	on	an	Association	Agreement.	The	Belarusian	govern-
ment	 is	not	 interested	 in	European	 integration,	and	has	previously	 rejected	an	 invitation	
from	the	EU	 to	 launch	negotiations	on	visa	 facilitation	and	 readmission.	The	main	 focus	
of	 the	EU	report	 is	criticism	of	 the	significant	deterioration	of	human	rights	and	 the	 rule	
of	 law	 in	Belarus.	As	a	 result,	 the	EU	 introduced	visa	 sanctions	and	 froze	 the	bank	ac-
counts	of	243	people	responsible	for	persecution	of	the	opposition.	It	also	froze	the	assets	
The adoption of new guiding principles 
and changes to the instruments 
of the neighbourhood policy are a step 
in the right direction. Unfortunately, 
the changes are not comprehensive 
enough to fully address the complexity 
of the present challenges and have 
been implemented too slowly 
to keep up with the dynamics of 
an ever-changing context.
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of	32	companies	which	support	the	current	regime,	introduced	an	embargo	on	the	sale	of	
arms	and	internal	repression	material.	It	blocked	aid	offered	to	Belarus	as	part	of	macro-
economic	support	mechanisms,	including	as	part	of	the	European	Investment	Bank	and	the	
EBRD,	and	significantly	limited	financial	support	for	the	country.	The	measures	taken	by	the	
EU	aim	to	strengthen	civil	society	and	political	opposition	–	in	2011,	the	EU	allocated	over	
20	million	euros	to	this	project.
Barriers to the implementation of the neighbourhood policy 
The	adoption	of	new	guiding	principles	and	changes	to	the	instruments	of	the	neighbour-
hood	policy	are	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	Furthermore,	they	will	most	likely	contribute	
to	measures	 taken	by	 the	EU	having	a	greater	effectiveness.	Unfortunately,	 the	changes	
are	not	comprehensive	enough	to	fully	ad-
dress	the	complexity	of	the	present	chal-
lenges	 and	 have	 been	 implemented	 too	
slowly	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 the	 dynamics	 of	
an	 ever-changing	 context.	 Consequently,	
the	measures	adopted	by	the	EU	have	had	
a	limited	impact	on	the	situation	in	the	Neighbourhood.	This	is	evident	in	the	lack	of	changes	
anticipated	in	the	partner	countries	–	they	largely	failed	to	bring	about	modernisation	(with	
the	exception	to	some	extent	of	Georgia),	and	did	not	successfully	deal	with	the	weakness	
of	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	the	countries’	political	systems	(see	Appendix,	Table	4).	
•	 Many	of	the	measures	which	the	EU	took	in	2011	focused	on	streamlining	its	own	instru-
ments	for	the	implementation	of	EU	policy	regarding	its	neighbours	and	this	limited	its	
capacity	for	direct	political	activity	within	the	Neighbourhood.	As	a	result,	the	changes	
primarily	affected	the	EU’s	own	bureaucratic	and	administrative	systems	and	made	lit-
tle	political	impact	elsewhere.	The	reform’s	disappointing	political	implications	come	as	
a	 result	of	 the	 failure	 to	set	out	clear,	 long-term	goals	 for	 the	policy	 (for	example,	by	
stating	clearly	whether	partner	countries	have	a	real	prospect	of	 full	EU	membership,	
or	whether	the	process	aims	only	at	economic	integration,	or	even	whether	the	policy	
simply	prioritises	direct	cooperation	between	neighbouring	states).
•	 The	EU	pays	great	attention	to	long-term	bureaucratic	and	technical	measures	(i.e.	the	
process	of	negotiating	further	agreements,	organising	various	meetings,	or	carrying	out	
projects).	To	date,	however,	this	has	failed	to	produce	a	qualitative	change	in	bilateral	
relations	and	the	measurable	effects	of	European	integration	(e.g.	the	signing	of	associa-
tion	agreements,	the	creation	of	free	trade	areas,	or	the	introduction	of	visa-free	travel).	
The	legal	basis	for	EU	relations	with	Eastern	Partnership	countries	continues	to	be	rooted	
in	Partnership	and	Cooperation	Agreements	signed	in	1998	and	1999,	while	at	the	opera-
tional	level,	relations	are	based	on	the	implementation	of	Action	Plans	(this	has	been	the	
case	since	2005/6;	since	2009	Ukraine	has	been	implementing	an	Association	Agenda).	
•	 There	 is	a	clear	 tendency	within	 the	EU	to	draw	out	bureaucratic	procedures.	This	 is	
coupled	with	a	lack	of	political	will	to	make	binding	decisions	which	lead	towards	closer	
integration.	This	is	exemplified	by,	for	instance,	the	negotiations	an	action	plan	on	visa	
facilitation,	 currently	being	undertaken	by	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	Under	 current	 rules,	
meeting	all	of	the	conditions	stipulated	by	the	EU	does	not	automatically	translate	into	
the	introduction	of	visa-free	travel	since	this	ultimately	depends	on	a	political	decision	
being	made	 by	 EU	member	 states.	 Consequently,	 the	 unpredictability	 of	 the	 system	
weakens	the	engagement	of	partner	countries	in	their	efforts	to	implement	reforms.
The ENP is likely to focus on coopera-
tion at a technical and sectoral level 
in selected areas of mutual interest. 
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•	 In	effect,	the	changes	to	the	ENP,	initiated	in	2011	and	continued	in	the	ENP	Package	
in	2012,	should	be	seen	as	more	of	a	revision	of	EU	instruments	and	a	shift	in	rhetoric	
rather	than	a	significant	qualitative	change	in	policy.	The	key	role	of	the	policy	continues	
to	be	limited	to	the	bilateral	dimension	of	relations,	is	implemented	at	a	governmental	
and	administrative	level	and	is	focused	on	the	negotiation	of	agreements	and	coopera-
tion	at	a	technical	level.	This	role	also	takes	up	the	most	resources.	By	2014	the	use	
of	 the	 ‘more	 for	 less’	principle	will	be	markedly	 restricted	since	most	of	 the	 financial	
resources	are	pre-allocated	to	each	partner	country,	and	the	additional	pot	of	money	set	
aside	for	states	which	achieve	significant	progress	is	relatively	small	(670	million	euros	
for	the	entire	Neighbourhood,	which	is	to	be	used	by	2013	through	SPRING	and	EaPIC).	
The	resources	for	the	support	of	civil	society	are	also	relatively	small	(26	million	euros	an-
nually,	distributed	through	the	CSF	among	all	partner	countries,	out	of	which	12	million	
euros	is	earmarked	for	the	South;	the	EED	has	not	yet	come	into	force).		
Since	2011,	the	EU	has	increasingly	stressed	the	use	of	the	ENP	in	contributing	to	the	
resolution	of	regional	conflicts	in	the	Eastern	Neighbourhood.	However,	the	ENP	provi-
sions	regarding	conflicts	in	Transnistria	and	in	the	South	Caucasus	do	not	propose	any	
new	measures.	Due	to	its	lack	of	effective	instruments	and	the	fact	that	it	is	viewed	as	
having	low	political	significance	in	the	Neighbourhood,	the	EU’s	limited	capacity	to	influ-
ence	the	situation	in	this	region	is	particularly	visible.		
•	 It	is	also	important	to	recognise	the	limited	role	of	the	Commission	and	the	EEAS,	whose	
actions	are	largely	tied	to	political	decisions	taken	by	EU	member	states.	Given	the	cur-
rent	circumstances	inside	the	EU	(including,	the	eurozone	crisis	and	the	reform	of	EU	
decision-making	mechanisms)	few	countries	are	interested	in	increasing	the	EU’s	politi-
cal	engagement	in	Eastern	Europe.	As	a	result,	the	ENP	is	likely	to	focus	on	cooperation	
at	a	technical	and	sectoral	level	in	selected	areas	of	mutual	interest.	
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AppeNd i x
Table 1. Current state of negotiations on Association Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries
Association Agreement  (AA)4 Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement (DCFTA)
Outlook for the negotiations 
and implementation of the AA5
Armenia negotiations	launched	in	July	2010
7	plenary	meetings	held	to	date
most	chapters	regarding	CFSP,	
JFS	and	sectoral	policy	have	been	closed	
(21	of	28	chapters)
decision	to	launch	negotiations	
taken	by	the	Commission	
in	February	2012
negotiations	on	the	AA	and	DCFTA	expected	
to	be	at	an	advanced	stage	or	completed	
by	autumn	2013	
Association	Agenda	to	be	agreed	in	2013
Azerbaijan negotiations	launched	in	July	2010
5	plenary	meetings	held	to	date
progress	in	negotiations	on	JFS,	trade	and	
sectoral	policy	(13	of	28	chapters	closed),	
problems	in	negotiations	on	CFSP
not	a	WTO	member
made	no	progress	in	WTO	mem-
bership	negotiations	in	2011	
(not	a	single	WTO	Working	Party	
meeting	went	ahead)	
negotiations	on	the	AA	expected	to	be	
advanced	or	completed	by	autumn	2013	
progress	in	WTO	negotiations	
Association	Agenda	to	be	agreed	in	2013
Belarus - not	a	WTO	member -
Georgia negotiations	launched	in	July	2010
7	plenary	meetings	held	to	date
most	chapters	on	CFSP,	JFS,	and	sectoral	
policy	have	been	closed	(20	of	28)
Decision	to	launch	negotiations	
taken	by	the	EC	in	December	2011
negotiations	began	in	February	
2012
negotiations	on	the	AA	and	DCFTA	expected	
to	be	advanced	or	completed	by	autumn	
2013	
Association	Agenda	to	be	agreed	in	2013
Moldova negotiations	launched	in	January	2010
8	plenary	meetings	held	to	date
Decision	to	launch	negotiations	
taken	by	the	EC	in	December	2011
negotiations	began	in	February	
2012
negotiations	on	the	AA	and	DCFTA	expected	
to	be	advanced	or	completed	by	autumn	
2013	
Association	Agenda	to	be	agreed	in	2013
Ukraine negotiations	launched	in	March	2007
negotiations	completed	in	December	
2011	(after	21	rounds)
AA	initialled	30	March	2012
negotiations	launched	in	February	
2008
negotiations	completed	in	Decem-
ber	2011	(after	18	rounds)
first	and	last	page	of	the	document	
initialled	on	30	March	2012
signing	of	the	AA	contingent	on	progress	
on	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law
no	dates	set;	EU	decision	will	depend	
on	the	fairness	of	parliamentary	elections	
scheduled	for	October	2012	
4	 An	Association	Agreement	consists	of	four	parts	on:	political	dialogue,	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	(CFSP),	Justice,	Freedom	and	Security	(JFS),	
economic	and	sectoral	cooperation.	Part	four	is	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Agreement	(DCFTA),	negotiated	separately	(available	only	to	WTO	
members);	Source:	“Implementation	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	in	2011	–	Regional	Report:	Eastern	Partnership”,	SWD(2012)	112,	Brussels	
15/5/2012.
5	 Based	on	“Eastern	Partnership:	A	Roadmap	to	the	autumn	2013	Summit”,	JOIN	(2012)13,	Brussels	15/5/2012.
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Table 2. Current state of negotiations on Visa Facilitation Agreements with European Partnership 
countries
Visa Facilitation and 
Readmission Agreement 
Visa talks Action Plan on Visa 
Facilitation 
Mobility Partnerships
Armenia negotiations	launched	
in	March	2012;	
agreement	possible	by	2013
-- -- signed	in	October	
2011
Azerbaijan negotiations	launched	
in	March	2012;	agreement	
possible	by	2013
-- -- --
Belarus Commission	invited	Belarus	
to	launch	negotiations	in	June	
2011;	Belarus	has	not	yet	
responded	
-- -- --
Georgia came	into	force	in	March	
2011
scheduled	to	begin	in	2012 -- signed	in	November	
2009
Moldova came	into	force	in	March	
2008	
launched	in	June	2010 presented	in	January	2011;
implementation	of	phase	
1	at	advanced	stage
signed	in	November	
2009
Ukraine came	into	force	in	January	
2008	
launched	in	October	2008 presented	in	November	2010;
implementation	of	phase	
1	at	advanced	stage
--
Table 3. Additional EU funds earmarked for ENP in 2011 (in EUR)
Eastern Neighbourhood Southern Neighbourhood
Name Amount Name Amount
Eastern	Partnership -- Partnership	for	Democracy	
and	Shared	Prosperity
646	mn	(redirected	from	existing	
resources)	
EaPIC	(Eastern	Partnership	
Integration	and	Cooperation	
Programme)
130	mn SPRING 540	mn
Additional	funds	allocated	to	
European	Investment	Bank	
for	Eastern	Neighbourhood	
(incl.	Russia)
150	mln additional	funds	allocated	to	
European	Investment	Bank	
for	Southern	Neighbourhood
1	bn	
EBRD -- EBRD	new	credit	line	for	Southern	
Neighbourhood	
100	mn
NIF	–	funds	at	the	end	of	2011 174	mn	(leveraging	projects	
up	to	4,2	bn)
NIF	–	funds	at	the	end	of	2011 226	mn	(leveraging	projects	
up	to	9.4	bn)
Civil	Society	Facility no	funds	earmarked	for	Eastern	
Neighbourhood	
Civil	Society	Facility yearly	budget:	26	million	
(2001-2013);	12	million	earmarked	
for	Southern	Neighbourhood
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Table 4. Current state of democracy and freedom in ENP countries
COUNTRy DEMOCRACy 
Democracy Index 
 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit6 
(1	worst	–	10	best)
Indicator/ranking
CORRUPTION 
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 
Transparenty 
International7
(1	worst	–	10	best)
Indicator/ranking
DEVElOPMENT 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
UNDP8
	
(0.000	worst	–	1	best)
Indicator/ranking
FREEDOM 
Freedom in the World 
 
Freedom House9 
(1	best	–	7	worst)
Indicator
yEAR 2008 2010 2011 2007 2010 2011 2005 2010 2011 2007 2010 2011 2012
Armenia 4.09	/	
113
4.09	/	
109
4.09	/	
111
3.0	/	
99
2.6	/	
123
2.6	/	
129
0.755	/	
83
0.695	/	
76
0.716	/	
86
4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0
Azerbaijan 3.19	/	
135
3.15	/	
135
3.15	/	
140
2.1	/	
150
2.4	/	
134
2.4	/	
143
0.746	/	
98
0.713	/	
67
0.700	/	
91
5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Belarus 3.34	/	
132
3.34	/	
130
3.16	/	
139
2.1	/	
150
2.5	/	
127
2.4	/	
143
0.804	/	
64
0.732	/	
61
0.756	/	
65
6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Georgia 4.62	/	
104
4.59	/	
103
4.74	/	
102
3.4	/	
79
3.8	/	
68
4.1	/	
64
0.754	/	
96
0.698	/	
74
0.733	/	
75
3.0 4.0 3.5 3.5
Moldova 6.50	/	
62
6.33	/	
65
6.33	/	
64
2.8	/	
111
2.9	/	
105
2.9	/	
112
0.708	/	
111
0.623	/	
99
0.649	/	
111
3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0
Ukraine 6.94	/	
53
6.30	/	
67
5.94	/	
79
2.7	/	
118
2.4	/	
134
2.3	/	
152
0.788	/	
76
0.710	/	
69
0.729	/	
76
2.5 2.5 3.0 3.5
Algeria 3.32	/	
133
3.44	/	
125
3.44	/	
130
3.0	/	
99
2.9	/	
105
2.9	/	
112
0.733	/	
104
0.677	/	
84
0.698	/	
96
5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Egypt 3.89	/	
119
3.07	/	
138
3.95	/	
115
2.9	/	
105
3.1	/	
98
2.9	/	
112
0.708	/	
112
0.620	/	
101
0.644	/	
113
5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Israel 7.48	/	
38
7.48	/	
37
7.53	/	
36
6.1	/	
30
6.1	/	
30
5.8	/	
36
0.932	/	
23
0.872	/	
15
0.888	/	
17
1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Jordan 3.93	/	
117
3.74	/	
117
3.89	/	
118
4.7	/	
53
4.7	/	
50
4.5	/	
56
0.773	/	
86
0.681	/	
82
0.698	/	
95
4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
lebanon 5.62	/	
89
5.82	/	
86
5.32	/	
94
3.0	/	
99
2.5	/	
127
2.5	/	
134
0.772	/	
88
-- 0.739	/	
71
4.5 4.0 4.0 4.5
libya 2.00	/	
159
1.94	/	
158
3.55	/	
125
2.5	/	
131
2.2	/	
146
2	/	
168
0.818	/	
56
0.755	/	
53
0.760	/	
64
7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5
Morocco 3.88	/	
120
3.79	/	
116
3.89	/	
119
3.5	/	
72
3.4	/	
85
3.4	/	
80
0.646	/	
126
0.567	/	
114
0.582	/	
130
4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Palestine 5.83	/	
85
5.44	/	
93
4.97	/	
99
-- -- -- 0.731	/	
106
-- 0.641	/	
114
-- 6.0 5.5 6.0/5.510
Syria 2.18	/	
156
2.31	/	
152
1.99	/	
157
2.4	/	
138
2.5	/	
127
2.6	/	
129
0.724	/	
108
0.589	/	
111
0.632	/	
119
6.5 6.5 6.5 7.0
Tunisia 2.96	/	
141
2.79	/	
144
5.53	/	
92
4.2	/	
61
4.3	/	
59
3.8	/	
73
0.766	/	
91
0.683	/	
81
0.698	/	
94
5.5 6.0 6.0 3.5
6	 https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011
7	 http://cpi.transparency.org
8	 http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/
9	 http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports
10	 For	Gaza	and	the	West	Bank,	respectively.
